Dr. David Godden
Associate Professor
Director of the Undergraduate Program in Philosophy
Research Interests
Dr. Godden’s primary areas of research are argumentation theory, epistemology, and informal logic. Generally speaking, I study the normative dimensions of argumentation (understood as those practices by which we transact reasons with one another), and reasoning (our internalization of those practices whereby we transact reasons with ourselves). My interests in these activities are almost exclusively epistemological: the primary normative status I concern myself with is epistemic justification, which I understand in terms of other statuses like commitment, entitlement, and recognition. My approach to theorizing our discursive and epistemic norms is thoroughly dialectical. In this respect, my work remains significantly informed by the postdoctoral work I did with Douglas Walton, as well as the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation. More recently, it is increasingly influenced by pragmatism, especially by the work of Robert Brandom. Presently, I have active, ongoing projects on the following topics: deep disagreements; presumption and burden of proof; disagreement and trust; adversariality and civility in public argumentative discourse; aretaic approaches to argumentative norms; formal models of argumentative dialogue. For example, here’s a link to a talk I recently gave on disagreement and trust as part of MSU’s Center for Interdisciplinarity (C4I) University Interdisciplinary Colloquium (UIC): Talk poster / abstract ; Link to talk on YouTube
Recent Publications
a representative sample indicative of my present and ongoing research interests
- Godden, D. (2021 / forthcoming). Getting out in front of the Owl of Minerva Problem. Argumentation: An International Journal on Reasoning nn: pp–pp. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-021-09554-2 Preview: https://rdcu.be/cwL6l
- Godden, D. (2021). The compliment of rational opposition: Disagreement, adversariality, and disputation. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 40(5): 845-858. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09768-9 Preview: https://rdcu.be/czk97
- Godden, D. (2021). Epistemic autonomy, epistemic paternalism, and blindspots of reason. In G. Axtell and A. Bernal (Eds.), Epistemic paternalism: Conceptions, justifications, and implications (pp. 181-197). London: Rowman & Littlefield. Draft Preview
- Davis, J., and Godden, D. (2021). Adversarial listening in argumentation. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 40(5): 925-937. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09730-1 Preview: https://rdcu.be/cbvZV
- Godden, D., and Grey, J. (2021). Reasoning by grounded analogy. Synthese 199, 5419–5453. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02974-9 Preview: https://rdcu.be/cACtw
- Godden, D. and Casey, J. (2020). No place for compromise: Resisting the shift to negotiation. Argumentation: An International Journal on Reasoning 34: 499–535. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-020-09517-z Preview: https://rdcu.be/b3b7c
- Godden, D. (2019). On the rational resolvability of deep disagreement through meta-argumentation: A resource audit. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 38: 725-750. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09682-1 Preview: https://rdcu.be/b9oKi
- Godden, D. (2019). Corroboration: Sensitivity, safety, and explanation. Acta Analytica 34(1): 15-38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-0351-x Preview: https://rdcu.be/NHN8
- Godden, D. and Zenker, F. (2018). A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency. Synthese 195: 1715–1740. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1299-2 Preview: http://rdcu.be/oejr
- Godden, D. (2017). Presumption as a modal qualifier: Presumption, inference, and managing epistemic risk. Argumentation: An International Journal on Reasoning 31: 485-511. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-017-9422-1Preview: http://rdcu.be/peze
- Godden, D. (2016). On the priority of agent-based argumentative norms. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 35: 345-357. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9296-x
Undergraduate Courses Regularly Taught
PHL460 – Epistemology (Text: Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge, Oxford UP, 2001)
PHL492 – Capstone Seminar for Majors (Seminar on Philosophy of Trust; student editorships of Elenchus: A Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy at Michigan State University)
PHL418 – Seminar in 20th Century Philosophy (When last offered, we read: Russell’s (1918) Philosophy of Logical Atomism; Ayer’s (1936/1946) Language, Truth, and Logic; Wittgenstein’s posthumous (1969) On Certainty; and Sellars’s (1956) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind)
PHL330 – Formal Reasoning (Text: D. Barker-Plummer, J. Barwise, and J. Etchemendy, Language, Proof and Logic. 2nd edition. Stanford, CA: CLSI Publications, 2011)
PHL130 – Logic & Reasoning (Various texts)
Recent Graduate Courses Taught
Seminar on Wittgenstein (with Prof. Jamie Nelson) Fall 2019
Notice to Prospective Graduate Students
I welcome the opportunity to work with new and current graduate students on projects that are in line with the research interests, approaches, and topics outlined above. I am especially interested in supervising graduate studies in those topical areas of my active, ongoing projects, mentioned earlier. While I have worked on argumentation schemes in the past, I am not interested in supervising projects seeking to provide a classificatory catalogue of argumentation schemes or seeking to provide an underlying theory of their typology. Previously, I have co-authored papers with graduate students (Davis & Godden, 2021) I am mentoring. Generally, I am happy to engage in collaborative research projects with graduate students whether or not those projects feature in their dissertational plans. Interested students are encouraged to contact me directly by email in advance of their applying to the program. You can email me here: dgodden@msu.edu
curriculum vitae | http://www.davidgodden.ca | Information on this page current as of October, 2021